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Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks,the first war of the twenty-first century eruptedas the United States began the aerial bombard-
ment of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The locus
of this new war surprised many: most discussion
and predictions of United States military action over
the past decade envisioned a war in East Asia—with
China over Taiwan, or with North Korea—or in the
Middle East. Instead, the countries of South Asia are
now the focus of the world’s attention.
The military action that has been undertaken to
unearth the roots of terrorism in South Asia comes
fraught with geopolitical dangers. Pakistan has
placed itself in an extremely tenuous position—as
a Muslim country supporting a war against another
Muslim country, as a military dictatorship without
domestic or international legitimacy, and as home
to a plethora of Islamist groups that have been
implicated in terrorist acts in South Asia and
beyond. India, which has long been complaining to
the international community about the terrorist
strikes it has endured for the past dozen years, is
being asked to exercise restraint in the face of con-
tinuing provocations. Muslim states spanning half
the globe, from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia, face ris-
ing tides of internal dissent. Some of this dissent is
closely linked to longtime American support for
quasi-authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The
path that the United States has laid out for itself—to
vanquish terrorism and the regimes that support or
enable it—is armed with its own risks.
Should the United States simply relegate Afghan-
istan, and South Asia in general, to the outer fringes
of its concerns once Osama bin Laden and his
acolytes in the Al Qaeda terror network have been
either prosecuted or destroyed, Afghanistan could
again become a fertile arena for the genesis of other
militant Islamist organizations intent on wreaking
havoc on the Western world. Such willful amnesia
about Afghanistan and the concomitant demise of
policy attention would ill serve American interests.
What should the United States do to lessen the
chances that its current actions will simply lay
another minefield to be negotiated 10 years further
down the road? Part of the answer to that question
can be found in looking back at the reasons why
Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, became a
haven for malign forces.
AFGHANISTAN’S RUPTURED HISTORY
Afghan society suffered considerably in the last
few decades of the twentieth century. Its recent spate
of conflict and despair started in 1973 with the over-
throw of King Mohammed Zahir Shah by his ambi-
tious cousin, Mohammed Daoud. A series of coups
and countercoups followed until the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in an
attempt to prevent what had become a socialist-
oriented regime on its borders from collapsing. It
was also an attempt to prevent the percolation of a
brand of radical Islam into the Soviet Central Asian
republics, where Islamist disaffection with  Moscow
was already brewing.
The regime of Babrak Karmal that the Soviet
army installed quickly became the focus of
widespread international opposition. The Soviet
invasion was overwhelmingly condemned in the
United Nations. The United States, under the lead-
ership of its newly inaugurated president, Ronald
Reagan, whose initial years in power were marked
by demonization of the Soviet Union, embarked on
a campaign to curb Soviet expansionism on a global
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basis and made Afghanistan one of its principal bat-
tlegrounds in that campaign. To this end, it elicited
the support of the Pakistani military dictatorship of
President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq in supplying and
training the mujahideen, the various groups fight-
ing the Soviet invaders.
Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had ostra-
cized Zia’s regime because of its abysmal human
rights record and its feckless pursuit of nuclear
weapons. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
the United States government overlooked the Zia
regime’s significant democratic deficit and its head-
long pursuit of nuclear weapons. It also acquiesced
to the extortionate demands of the Pakistani army’s
counterintelligence organization, the Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (ISI). This shadowy organiza-
tion, unaccountable to any entity but the highest
echelons of the Pakistani military and the dictator
himself, obtained control over the aid pipeline to
the Afghan mujahideen.
General Zia, meanwhile, was intent on bolster-
ing his own domestic legitimacy by courting the
Muslim clergy within Pakistan. As a result, and with
the tacit acceptance of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Zia’s minions in the ISI directed a dispro-
portionate amount of the American assistance to
the most religiously zealous mujahideen organiza-
tion in Afghanistan—the Hizb-i-Islami—even
though this group was not at the forefront of the
military confrontations with the Soviet army. Armed
with Pakistani-supplied American weaponry and
Saudi money, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of
the Hizb-i-Islami, and his followers were given free
rein in the Afghan refugee camps that had been
formed in western Pakistan. There Hekmatyar’s
forces began to indoctrinate many young, hapless
Afghan men, both to fight against the infidels who
had come to occupy their country and to adhere to
a particularly harsh and unyielding form of Islam.
The American-aided war against the Soviet occu-
pation was slow but eventually successful. After 10
years of fighting, the Soviet government, now led by
Mikhail Gorbachev, finally decided to withdraw from
Afghanistan. As Soviet troops left, they replaced Kar-
mal with Mohammed Najibullah, a Pashtun (one of
the country’s largest ethnic groups), who had been
the head of KHAD, Afghanistan’s dreaded intelligence
and espionage organization. Within months, the var-
ious mujahideen groups were challenging the
Najibullah regime and fighting among themselves in
a wasteful civil war. Thanks to the significant mili-
tary and organizational resources at Najibullah’s com-
mand, he managed to cling to power until 1992.
In the end, Najibullah was ousted not by the ISI’s
favorite, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had demon-
strated far greater skill in proselytization than in
battle tactics, but by the forces of the ethnically
Tajik leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. After Najibul-
lah’s fall, Pakistan attempted to broker a power-
sharing arrangement among the various insurgent
groups, who were still divided along lines of ideol-
ogy, tribal loyalty, and personality. Massoud and his
political mentor, Burhanuddin Rabbani, however,
proved incapable of reaching any viable accommo-
dation with the other mujahideen organizations. 
ENTER THE TALIBAN
As civil war and unrest continued to shred the
remnants of Afghan society, another, far more
vicious group was forming in the refugee camps in
Pakistan. This new force was composed of young
men who had grown up in the camps during the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, detached from
the normal ties of kith and kin and imbued with
radical Islamic fervor in the madrassas (Islamic
schools) that Saudi financiers had set up in the
refugee camps. Left to themselves, these young men
might have joined one of the many mujahideen
groups fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, or
they might have become members of one of the
various insurgent groups that the ISI was also nur-
turing to spread terror in the Indian-controlled
portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kash-
mir, where an indigenously based insurgency had
erupted in 1989.
But these taliban (students) from the madrassas
were singled out by the Harvard-educated prime
minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto (who had been
elected after Zia died in 1988 in a plane crash), and
her interior minister, Naserullah Babar, a former
military officer, and were carefully organized into a
viable fighting force. Bhutto hoped to use this group
of religious zealots as a pliant entity to serve Pak-
istan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. Bhutto and
Babar, along with significant segments of the Pak-
istani strategic community, believed these fighters
could bring to power a regime dependent on and
grateful to Pakistan, thereby giving Pakistan “strate-
gic depth” in the event of yet another conflict with
its long-standing adversary, India.
Even after the fall of Bhutto’s government, suc-
cessive Pakistani regimes continued the policies she
had initiated, and in 1996 the Taliban successfully
overthrew the Rabbani regime. Afghanistan’s battle-
weary population initially greeted the Taliban as lib-
erators who could bring some stability to their
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beleaguered land. As with most things in Afghani-
stan, their joy did not last long.
Almost immediately, the Taliban ruthlessly elim-
inated nearly all sources of opposition. Massoud’s
forces, reeling from the organization, zeal, and Pak-
istani-supplied firepower of the Taliban, were
forced to take refuge in the Panjshir Valley in
northern Afghanistan. Within the territories of
Afghanistan that they came to control, the Taliban
promptly moved to impose their strictures on the
population. Their views and practices were utterly
obscurantist. Their misogyny seemed to know no
bounds, and they evinced an extraordinary intol-
erance toward other religious groups and other
Islamic sects. Violators of their decrees were met
with draconian punishment.
AMERICA’S ROLE
The Taliban had found support not only from
their original sponsors, the Saudis and the Pakista-
nis, but also from the United States. The United
States tacitly supported the Taliban because they
appeared to have brought a degree of stability to
Afghanistan. The American policy was also encour-
aged by the lobbying of some powerful American
oil companies that were actively seeking to build a
gas pipeline across Afghanistan from the Central
Asian states to Pakistan. Only when steady reports
of the Taliban’s retrograde practices toward women
caught the attention of American feminist and
human rights groups did the United States start to
waver in its support for the Taliban.
Soon the United States would have other reasons
to be ill disposed toward the Taliban. In 1996
Osama bin Laden, the son of a Saudi construction
magnate, moved to Afghanistan after he had been
ousted from Saudi Arabia and then Sudan for his
terrorist activities. The Taliban welcomed him to
Afghanistan because he shared their deep distrust
of the United States, adhered to the same austere
version of Islam they practiced, and benefited them
with his financial largesse. 
Bin Laden’s hatred for the United States stemmed
from a variety of sources. Like many radical Arabs,
he was unalterably opposed to American support
for Israel. He also believed that the presence of
United States troops had defiled the soil of Islam’s
sacred land, Saudi Arabia, and he was opposed to
American support for what he believed was a cor-
rupt Saudi monarchy. Two years after his arrival in
Afghanistan, bin Laden and his radical Islamic orga-
nization, Al Qaeda, were implicated in the bomb-
ings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
THE INDIAN CONNECTION
As the Taliban consolidated its hold over Afghan-
istan, they played host not only to bin Laden and Al
Qaeda but also to a variety of other ISI-supported
groups that were intent on carrying their jihad into
the Indian-controlled portions of Jammu and Kash-
mir. These groups, comprising Afghans, Arabs, Pak-
istanis, and disaffected Kashmiris, contributed to a
reign of terror and mayhem throughout the Kashmir
Valley during the last decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. The Indian security forces resorted to harsh
counterinsurgency tactics in attempts to defeat them.
Often the native Kashmiri population found itself
caught in the crossfire between the brutal tactics of
the insurgents and the repressive methods of the
Indian forces. 
Despite the continuing alienation of Kashmir’s
population from the Indian state, toward the end of
the 1990s the insurgency started to wane. The local
population, while unhappy with India, had devel-
oped a deep distaste for the Islamic zealots who had
turned the initial uprising into a ruthless protection
racket with religious overtones.
Meanwhile, Indian national leaders repeatedly
asked the United States to take notice of Pakistan’s
deep involvement with the various insurgent orga-
nizations, all of which were headquartered in Pak-
istan. They also tried to persuade the international
community to recognize these organizations’ funda-
mental character as purveyors of terror. Despite the
viciousness of their attacks on civilian populations
in Kashmir and elsewhere in India, the insurgents
have until now escaped the disapprobation of the
international community and have not been labeled
as terrorist organizations by the United States.
Against this backdrop, a set of related events
rocked the subcontinent. In May 1998, India car-
ried out five nuclear tests. Not surprisingly, and
despite American blandishments and offers of eco-
nomic assistance, Pakistan carried out its own set
of tests within two weeks. The tests refocused inter-
national attention on the Kashmir dispute; key
nations, particularly the United States, sounded the
dual tocsins of nuclear proliferation and the danger
of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan.
The volatility of the Kashmir dispute, which had
precipitated two earlier wars between India and
Pakistan (in 1947–1948 and 1965), now raised
worldwide concern about the prospect of nuclear
war in the region. In an effort to assuage these con-
cerns, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India
met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan
in February 1999. Their meeting led to a set of
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agreements designed to reduce Indo-Pakistani ten-
sions, especially in the nuclear realm.
The gains of the Lahore summit evaporated in
the thin air of the Himalayas when in late April
1999, units of the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry,
along with Pakistani and Afghan irregulars, scaled
heights of over 14,000 feet to breach the Line of
Control (LoC), the de facto international border in
Kashmir. The Indian forces, who had been lulled
into a state of complacency in the aftermath of the
February 1999 summit, were unprepared for the
well-organized, Pakistan-sponsored infiltration,
which took place in the heights above Kargil and at
two other points along the LoC. After overcoming
the initial shock, the Indian troops retaliated with
considerable vigor. Nevertheless, it took them
nearly two and a half months to dislodge all the
intruders from the mountain redoubts.
Although the Indians resorted to the use of air-
power before launching the final infantry assaults 
on the well-entrenched
Pakistani positions, they
did not move to hori-
zontal escalation as they
had done in previous
conflict—especially in
1965—to relieve pres-
sure in the Kashmir sector. Nor did the Indian forces
cross the LoC in attempts to destroy Pakistani and
insurgent bases. The Indian unwillingness to expand
the scope and the intensity of the conflict can be
attributed to a clear-cut recognition that Pakistan was
now a nuclear-weapons state. Indian decision mak-
ers could not afford to provoke Pakistani anxieties in
a fashion that could lead to nuclear escalation.
Even though India did not lose any territory in
the Kargil war, the sense of injured innocence that
pervaded New Delhi undermined any prospect of
Indo-Pakistani rapprochement. Worse still, Pak-
istani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown
in a military coup in October 1999, in part because
of the fallout of the Kargil defeat. Although General
Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator who took
power after the coup, publicly called for renewed
talks with India, he actually created more permis-
sive conditions for the mujahideen to carry out
their war against India in Kashmir. As the insur-
gency in Kashmir proceeded apace, Indo-Pakistani
relations declined precipitously.
INTERSECTING INTERESTS
Indo-Pakistani relations will remain strained as
long as the Kashmir conflict persists. That conflict,
in turn, will continue as long as Pakistan maintains
its support of the various guerrillas fighting in
Kashmir and India remains unable to grant the
Kashmiris in its jurisdiction a fair political dispen-
sation. Yet, the American “war on terrorism,” if
properly fashioned, could provide the means for
bringing an end to this conflict.
Of course, the United States cannot confine its
strategic goals to simply defeating bin Laden and his
associates, for that would leave untouched the milieu
in which the various terrorist and insurgent groups
formed and developed. Unless the social, political,
and economic conditions that spawned Al Qaeda and
other associated groups are addressed, the United
States and its allies in Western Europe and elsewhere
will continue to be targeted by Islamist terrorists. To
forestall such outcomes the United States, in concert
with the relevant United Nations agencies, will have
to restore some semblance of state authority to
Afghanistan. The United States has provided varying






the models for a 
program of state building in Afghanistan, where
more vital and immediate United States interests
are implicated.
Forging such a strategy will first entail a long-
term and expansive American commitment to the
region. This will require devoting both material and
human resources to the reconstruction of Afghani-
stan. It will also involve helping the United Nations
and other regional actors, especially Pakistan and
India, promote a broad-based post-Taliban regime
in Afghanistan. Such a regime would have to com-
prise members of all of the country’s major ethnic
groups—Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. To
prevent a return to the warlordism that consumed
Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah, and to mon-
itor a program of disarming on the part of ethnic
and private militias, a UN peacekeeping force will
have to remain in the country for a number of
years. The most difficult part of the process may be
to find a political leader behind which all Afghans
can coalesce and who will also be accepted by Pak-
istan, India, and Russia. As this time, the only pos-
sible such leader appears to be the aged exiled king,
Zahir Shah, already in his late 80s.
Because the participation of Pakistan and India
will be crucial to this effort, the United States must
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The United States should urge the military regime 
of General Pervez Musharraf to spell out a viable
strategy for returning Pakistan to civilian rule.
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play an active role in ameliorating Indo-Pakistani
relations. To enlist Pakistan’s wavering support for
the prosecution of its war aims against bin Laden
and his hosts in Afghanistan, the United States has
lifted a panoply of sanctions that it had imposed on
Pakistan in the aftermath of the nuclear tests and
the military coup in 1999. It has also offered to
help alleviate Pakistan’s dire economic plight
through the deferral of various loan payments and
the provision of new resources from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. Discussions are now under
way to also provide modest military assistance to
Pakistan’s armed forces.
As a consequence, the United States now has
considerable leverage over the Pakistani politico-
military elite. Washington must not squander this
opportunity to push for a reorientation of Pakistan’s
domestic and external priorities as well as a reshap-
ing of some of Pakistan’s internal institutional
arrangements. It is especially important that the
United States urge the military regime of General
Pervez Musharraf to spell out a viable strategy for
returning Pakistan to civilian rule. To facilitate this
transfer of power, the United States should direct
some of its assistance to the strengthening of civil
society and civic institutions in Pakistan. Such
actions and strategies are hardly without precedent
in United States–Pakistan relations.
More specifically, the United States must
unequivocally press Pakistan to terminate its sup-
port of the various insurgent groups operating from
Pakistani territory. The vast majority of these
groups have directed their wrath against India.
Their ideological inclinations and political procliv-
ities are such that they pose a danger well beyond
their current activities in Kashmir, however. When
the Kashmir insurgency eventually ends, whether
through military suppression or negotiation, these
groups will begin to look for other targets, as long
as they still have succor, support, and sanctuaries.
Once their anti-Indian spleen has been vented there
is little reason to believe that they would not direct
their attention to Israel, the United States, or the
Western world in general. Consequently, although
the Pakistani military may be loath to admit it,
these groups do pose a long-term threat to the inter-
nal stability and governance of Pakistan.
More than a decade of support to these insur-
gent groups, not to mention three wars with India
over Kashmir, have not brought Pakistan any
closer to its goal of tearing Kashmir away from the
Indian union. The time has arrived to dispense
with this futile quest and accept the inevitable: the
status quo in Kashmir should be permanently
frozen and the hopes of merging all Kashmir into
Pakistan abandoned.
To be politically viable, this strategy must have
another critical component. No Pakistani leadership
will be able to end the activities of these groups
unless it can exact some concessions from India on
the Kashmir front. Again, the United States can and
should play an important role here. Washington has
recently started to dramatically improve its relations
with New Delhi. The acrimony and distrust that
long characterized Indo-American relations now
seems to be at least on hold, if not entirely at an end.
Careful American diplomacy can induce India to
undertake certain vital steps to restore normalcy in
its portion of Kashmir. Specifically, the United States
should prod India to reestablish Kashmir’s auton-
omy—guaranteed by the Indian constitution but
often compromised by the Indian government. To
win the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Kashmiris,
India should also steadily reduce its military and
paramilitary presence within Kashmir as Pakistani-
sponsored support for the terrorists draws to a close.
It must also honestly address widespread allegations
of human rights abuses on the part of its security
forces. Finally, as some semblance of political order
is restored in Kashmir, India will need to a make a
concerted attempt to promote economic develop-
ment in the state to create new employment oppor-
tunities. Such efforts will assuage many grievances
of a generation that has known little except violence
and upheaval. None of these tasks will be easy or
swift. However, the alternative to the pursuit of these
ameliorative measures means the continuation of a
degrading, sanguinary, and risk-laden strategy in
Kashmir and the continuing prospect of wider polit-
ical upheavals in the region and beyond. ■
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